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This paper endogenizes theinterplay between innovation by a regulated …rm and regulatory delay.
In the signaling model, the …rm times its innovation to communicate its private information about
the MC of delay to the regulator. When product innovation costs fall over time, an extra day
of regulatory delay increases time to introduction by more than a day. Successful signaling leads
the regulator to adjust regulatory delay. The separating equilibrium of the signaling model gener-
ates testable predictions for how innovation and regulatory delay evolve over time. The model is
consistent with data gathered from one of the Bell telecommunications …rms.
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION1 Introduction
The potential for economicregulation to distort theincentives ofthe…rm to innovate iswell known
(e.g., Sweeney, 1981; Cabral and Riordan, 1989). Most of the literature examining regulation and
innovation focuses on the impact of the type of regulatory regime (rate of return vs. incentive
regulation, for example) or on the frequency of policy revision (the so-called “regulatory lag”).
A little-explored avenue is the e¤ect of regulatory delay on innovation.1 Regulatory delay exists
when the regulator does not allow the introduction ofnew products without regulatory review and
approval. Regulated …rms—for example, in the telecommunications industry—often claim that
regulatory delays are long, costly, and distort the incentives to introduce new products. The im-
pacts may also run in theotherdirection: the …rm’s innovation decisionsmay reveal information to
the regulator, which might adjust regulatory delay in response. This direction of causality—from
…rm’s innovation to regulator’s policy— is neglected in the literature to my knowledge. This paper
provides one explanation for changes in regulatory delay and the timing of the …rm’s innovation.
The regulator adjusts delay over time as the …rm, through its timing of innovation, reveals infor-
mation about the cost of delay. The model developd places empirically testable restrictions on the
evolution of innovation delay and regulatory delay.
Recent history in the telecommunications industry shows that innovation and regulatory delay
change over time. In the data from the beginning of the 1990’s from four midwestern states
examined here, a given new product tended to beintroduced in di¤erent areas at di¤erent times; by
the end ofthedecadeproduct launches weremore likely to besimultaneous. Many stateregulatory
commissions have modi…ed their policies over time to allow products to reach the market sooner.
This pattern also shows up in these data. There are at least three possible explanations for the
shift in the …rms’ and the regulators’ behavior. First, perhaps the agents were not choosing the
optimal innovation timing and regulatory delay at …rst, and later they were. Second, it may be
1Note that “regulatory delay” is a di¤erent concept than “regulatory lag”. The former refers to delayed introduc-
tion of a new product, whereas the latter refers to the term of regulatory commitment.
1that the agents were optimizing, but that changing circumstances (i.e., parameters in theobjective
functions) changed the optimal actions. Third, and most economically interesting, the agents may
hold private information, and have adjusted their actions over time in response to information
revealed by theotheragent. In this paper I focus on this third explanation, by meansofa signaling
model.
Thereare regulator-sideand …rm-sidecomponentsto thedelay between technological feasibility
ofa product and its introduction to consumers. Theregulator-side component isthe time between
the …rm’s submission of a new product to the regulator for approval and the granting of approval.
I term this component regulatory delay (the term is not intended to be pejorative; delay may have
social bene…ts). The …rm-side component is the time between the …rst technologically feasible
introduction date2 and the submission of the product to the regulator. I term the …rm component
innovation delay. While regulation obviously creates regulatory delay, it may also in‡uence inno-
vation delay. Regulatory delay reduces the opportunity cost of innovation delay by pushing the
forgone pro…ts from the new product farther into the future. When innovation costs fall over time,
regulatory delay thereby induces the …rm to postpone innovation.
The regulator trades o¤ the bene…t of reducing regulatory delay (quicker return on investment
for the …rm and earlier accrual of bene…ts for consumers) and the costs (loss of regulatory control,
potentially lower quality of service, harm to competing …rms, and the like). The trade-o¤ depends
in part on the cost that regulatory delay imposes on the …rm, which is likely to be known by the
…rm better than the regulator. When the …rm knows that the regulator would reduce regulatory
delay if it knew the true cost of delay to the …rm, then the …rm would like to communicate its
private information to the regulator. The …rm can signal its cost of delay with an action that
cannot be pro…tably mimicked by a …rm with di¤erent cost. A costly action available to the…rm is
innovation delay. In particular, departures from the myopically optimal length of innovation delay
(where “myopic” means decision-making taking regulatory delay as …xed) can serve as signals to
2I.e., the …rst date at which the introduction costs are less than in…nite.
2the regulator.
Forinnovation delay to serve asa signal, it must beat least partially observableto theregulator.
Theregulatorisnot likely to know when productsaretechnologically feasible. Ifthe…rm operatesin
several jurisdictions (e.g., a Bell Operating Company spanning several states), and the…rm chooses
to introduce new products at di¤ering times in thevarious jurisdictions, each regulator learns from
observing the …rm’s actions in the other jurisdictions. Once the product is introduced in one area,
the regulator in another jurisdiction knows that introduction is technologically feasible.3 The …rm
can then usethetimeuntil subsequent submission forapproval in theother jurisdictions as a signal.
By jointly modeling the determination of regulatory and innovation delay, this article breaks
new ground. The earliest literature on regulation and the timing of innovation looked at a mo-
nopolist’s incentive to innovate given a …xed regulatory regime (Braeutigam, 1979). More recent
work focuses on adoption timing as entry deterrence or accommodation under di¤erent regulatory
regimes (Riordan, 1992; Lyon and Huang, 1995), but does not explicitly consider regulatory delay.
This paper leaves aside rivalry considerations to focus on the relationship between the regulator
and the …rm. There are a few empirical studies of the impacts of regulatory delay on innovation
(Prager, 1989; Prieger, 1999), but these focus on aspects other than asymmetric information and
signaling. Spiegel and Wilkie (1996) consider a model in which investment in a new technology
has signaling value in a regulated environment, although the receiver of the signal in their model
is the capital market, not the regulator.
The model may also apply to other regulatory settings, such as the timing of patenting and
patent approval, or of pharmaceutical development and regulatory approval. With minor modi-
…cations to the objective functions, the model may also apply to decision-making within a …rm,
where the agents are the R&D division and management, in place of the …rm and the regulator,
respectively. In this setting consumer surplus would not entermanagement’s objective function. In
3As long as the existing infrastructure among the jurisdictions is not too dissimilar. When looking at a single Bell
Operating Company, as in my empirical application, this is not likely to be a problem.
3each of thesesettings, there is asymmetric information and thepossibility of signaling and learning
over time.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I introduce a basic model of a …rm’s
decision of when to introduce a new product given the regulatory environment, and then embed
the model in a two-period signaling game. Section 3 presents the testableimplications derived from
the signaling model. Testing of the predictions is carried out in Section 4 with data from a Bell
Operating Company. The results show that the signaling model is consistent with the evolution of
innovation delay and regulatory delay in all states tested.
2 The Theoretical Model
2.1 A basic model with …xed regulatory delay
To develop a simple model of regulated product introduction, let time t = 0 represent the point at
which a …rm can …rst feasibly introduce a given product. The …rm chooses to submit the product
to the regulator for approval at time s ¸0, at which time it incurs …xed development (or adoption)
cost F(s). The length of innovation delay s will be referred to as the innovation date.4 Following
Riordan (1992), …xed costsare assumed to befalling over time as exogenous technological advances
lower the cost of adopting the new service: F0(t) < 0 and F00(t) > 0. Falling …xed costs give the
…rm an incentive to delay innovation. The regulator approves the service after an examination
period (i.e., regulatory delay) of length a. Consumers cannot purchase and …rms cannot sell the
good until time s+a, referred to asthe introduction date. After times+a, the …rm earns constant
‡ow pro…t of ¼(µ) per unit time, where µ 2 £ ½ R is a parameter known to the …rm but not the
regulator.5 I assume that ¼0(µ) > 0, so larger µ might correspond to higher demand or to lower
marginal costs. Note that ¼ is not an explicit function of price; to focus on the strategic variable
4Whether s represents true innovation or merely adoption of existing technology (di¤usion), the resulting game
is the same.
5The timing of the model is similar to that of Braeutigam (1979).
4s I assume that the …rm is allowed by the regulator to charge the pro…t-maximizing price,6 which
will be a function of µ. The …rm’s discount rate is r, so that its net present value of introduction










The …rm chooses optimal innovation date s¤(a;µ) = argmax
s
¦(s;a;µ) which is de…ned by the
…rst order condition (FOC):7
@¦(s; a; µ)
@s
= 0 ) rF(s¤) ¡F0(s¤) =e¡ra¼(µ) (2)
Theleft sideofequation(2) is themarginal bene…t (MB) from postponinginnovation(thereduction
in …xed costs), and right side is the marginal cost (MC) of the same (the forgone pro…t). Thus the
…rm’s private information about µ can be interpreted as information about the opportunity cost of
innovation delay (or, equivalently, of regulatory delay) to the …rm.
Given the assumptions of the model, these propositions follow (proofs are in an appendix).
Proposition 1 @¦=@a < 0 and @s¤=@a >0. Longer regulatory delay lowers the …rm’s pro…t and
induces the …rm to innovate later.
As regulatory delay increases (e.g., from aL to aH in Figure 1), the forgone pro…t is pushed
farther into thefutureand its present value, which istheMC ofdelay, falls. SinceMB is decreasing,
to re-equate MC and MB later innovation dates are chosen by the …rm. Thus there is a multiplier
associated withregulatory delay: addinga day to aincreases a+s, thedatetheserviceisintroduced
to consumers, by more than a day.
Proposition 2 @s¤=@µ < 0. A higher opportunity cost of delay induces the …rm to innovate
earlier.
6Many of the new telecommunications services introduced in the data are classed as “competitive” services and
are allowed to be freely priced by the …rm.
7To guarantee s
¤ > 0, assume rF(0)¡F
0(0) > e
¡ra¼(µ)8µ. To guarantee …nite s
¤, assume that limt!1 rF(t) ¡
F
0(t) · 0.
5The relevant picture is the same as Figure 1, where now the top MC curve corresponds to a
higher µ and the bottom MC curve corresponds to a lower µ. At …rst this result might appear
counterintuitive; if regulation is “bad for the …rm” why would higher regulation-induced costs lead
to earlier innovation? The answer is to distinguish between the direct and opportunity costs of
regulation. It is the opportunity costs of regulation that µ measures; as the forgone pro…t from
delay increases, the …rm innovates earlier to speed accrual of those pro…ts. If the direct cost of the
regulatory process is included as a constant in F, then an increase in direct cost would postpone
innovation. This can be seen from Figure 1 by shifting the MB of delay curve up.
2.2 A signaling model
In this section I present a two-period model of innovation and regulation that incorporates the
interaction between the …rm’s choice of innovation date and the regulator’s choice of regulatory
delay. Stage 1 of the game is the basic model above, where the initial level of regulatory delay,
a0 2 R+, is predetermined. To present the issues involved, I …rst discuss a simpli…ed model that
highlightstherole ofsignaling. In this …rst model, the …xed cost F is taken to beconstant and non-
prohibitive, so that the …rm wishes to introduce the product immediately. Thus the only potential
value of innovation dates after time 0 is to signal the …rm’s type. The …rm’s choice variable is the
stage 1 innovation date s 2 R+.
In stage2, thereis anothernew product opportunity, identical to that in stage1. The regulator
chooses a new level of delay, a 2 R+, then the …rm observes a and selects an innovation date
s2 2 R+ for the second new product. The timing of the game allows the …rm to signal its type
(taken to be …xed over stages) to the regulator in stage 1 to in‡uence the regulatory delay in stage
2.8 The assumption of constant …xed cost is relaxed later, in section 2.3.
The players in the game are the following.
8The game assumes that the regulator cannot commit in stage 1 to a policy a for stage 2. Lack of commitment
is a common assumption in regulatory games (outside of the mechanism design literature). See Spiegel and Spulber
(1997) for a discussion of why regulatory commitment is not a realistic assumption.
6The …rm The …rm’s pro…t in each stage is (1), except that now F(s) is constant. It is clear
that, absent declining …xed innovation costs and a signaling value to s, the optimal s is zero. Total
discounted pro…t is
¦sum(s;s2; a0;a;µ) = ¦(s; a0;µ) +±¦(s2; a;µ) (3)
The discount factor ± is determined from r and the (exogenous) time elapsing between stages (the
period of regulatory commitment). For simplicity, take £ ´fµL; µHg, µL < µH, so that there are
just two types: a low-cost type L and a high-cost type H. As above, “cost” here refers to the
opportunity cost of regulatory delay and is known only by the …rm.
The regulator Theregulator’sobjectivefunctionmay represent eithersocial welfare(the“benev-
olent dictator” framework) or the utility function of the regulator (the “economic theory of reg-
ulation” approach to regulation (Peltzman, 1976)). Given that a0 is predetermined, only stage 2
welfare is relevant. Take expected welfare in stage 2 to be
W(s2;a) =Eµ [CS(s2 +a;µ)+¦(s2;a;µ)+V(a)] (4)
Eµ represents expectation taken with respect to the regulator’s posterior beliefs b about the …rm’s
type. CS(t;µ) is net consumers’ surplus when the product is introduced at time t and the …rm’s
type is µ. I assume @CS=@t < 0, @CS=@µ ¸ 0, @2CS=@t2 ¸ 0, and @2CS=@t@µ · 0.9 The …rm’s
type a¤ects CS at least indirectly because the monopoly prices charged are a function of µ. If µ
represents a demand parameter, then µ will also have a direct impact on CS. V is the bene…t to
the regulator from regulatory delay, with V 0 >0.
The interpretation of V varies with the interpretation of the regulator’s objective. In a benev-
olent dictator setting, V may represent bene…ts not re‡ected in CS from higher quality or lower
level of externalities that may result from regulatory delay.10 In a political economy setting, V
9These assumptions are consistent with cs being the discounted present value of a constant surplus ‡ow ®(µ). For
example, if cs = exp(¡r[s +a])®=r, then as long as @cs=@µ ¸ 0, the other assumptions follow.
10If delay represents the time taken by the …rm to bring the product up to a regulatory quality standard, then
longer delays may increase product quality. If delay represents time taken by the regulator to investigate safety or
privacy concerns (e.g., caller ID or caller ID blocking), then longer delays may decrease externalities.
7might represent payo¤s (direct or indirect) to the regulator from the …rm’s rivals or a preference
for exercising authority.
Solution concept The relevant solution concept in this Spence-type signaling game is perfect
Bayesianequilibrium (PBE).11 A PBE consists ofthe…rm’s strategiess¤
1(a0; µ) for sand s¤
2(a;µ) for
s2, a strategy a¤(s) fortheregulator, and theregulator’sposteriorbeliefs b(s) about theprobability
after observing s that µ =µL, such that
² (s¤
1(a; µ); s¤
2(a; µ)) maximizes¦sum(s; s2;a0; a; µ) given the …rm’scorrect expectation that a =
a¤(s),
² a¤(s) maximizes W(s2;a) given the posterior beliefs and the regulator’s correct expectation
that s2 =s¤
2(a;µ), and
² the beliefs b(s) are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever possible.12
Note that the strategic variables of interest are s, the signal by the …rm in stage 1, and a,
the response by the regulator in stage 2. There will be no strategic considerations in the …rm’s
choice of s2, since it is the last move in the game. I restrict my focus to cases of successful
signaling: separating equilibria. As is well-known in signaling games, the PBE may admit too
many “unrealistic” equilibria because it does not restrict beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. Multiple
equilibria do not complicate testing the theory empirically, because in section 2.3 I show that all
separating equilibria share certain testable characteristics.
The regulator’s strategy Because the PBE is sequentially rational, we may use backward
induction to solve the game. In the …nal move of the game, the …rm chooses s¤
2 = 0 no matter
11I restrict attention to pure (non-random) strategies.
12In particular, on the equilibrium path, b = 1 if µ = µL in a screening equilibrium (the regulator learns the …rm’s
true type) and b cannot be updated in a pooling equilibrium (the regulator retains its prior beliefs when it receives
an uninformative signal). Bayes’ rule does not apply o¤ the equilibrium path, since there is no probability of ending
up there.
8what µ or a¤ is; with constant …xed costs, the …rm always prefers immediate innovation. Given
that s¤




2 =0; a)jb(s)] , (5)
the stage 2 welfare maximizing choice given the posterior beliefs after observing signal s from the


















Only the direct e¤ect of a on ¦ need be considered, since s¤
2 does not change with a. The term on
the left side is theMB ofdelay for the regulator. The right sideterms composethe regulator’s MC
of delay, which is equal to the MB at a¤.
Of central interest for characterizing a separating equilibrium is how a¤ changes with µ. Some
additional notation will be useful. Let aH and aL be the optimal regulatory delay in stage 2 when
the regulator knows that the …rm’s type is µL and µH, respectively. Whether aL is larger than
aH cannot be determined in general. The reason, made precise in the appendix, is as follows. If
V is assumed concave, the MB of delay for the regulator is decreasing in a. However, the MC of
delay for the regulator is also decreasing in a. The MC curve when the …rm is type H is above the
MC curve when the …rm is type L, given the assumptions in the model. Which downward-sloping
MC curve intersects with the downward-sloping MB curve at the smallest a therefore depends on
relative slopes of the MB and MC curves. The assumptions of the model do not say which curve
is steeper. Thus the optimal regulatory delay could either be increasing or decreasing in the …rm’s
type, and the sign of aL ¡aH is indeterminate. I develop results for both cases.
Consider theoutcomeofa separating equilibrium. Assumethat thepredetermineda0 isbetween
aL and aH.13 Since the sign of aL ¡ aH is ambiguous, the sign of a¤ ¡ a0 is also ambiguous in
13As it would be, for example, if a
¤ is monotone in µ and a0 is stage-optimal given the prior beliefs of the regulator.
9general, even if the …rm’s type is known. If aL < aH, then the low cost type wants to signal its
type to bring about a reduction in a. If aL > aH, then the high cost type wants to signal its type
to bring about a reduction in a.
The …rm’s strategy Looking ahead to a¤(s), the regulator’s policy, the …rm wishes to signal its
type when doing so will cause the regulator to reduce regulatory delay from a0. Take …rst the case
where aL < aH. The low cost type L has an incentive to signal its type to receive aL rather than
aH, since lower a is always better for the …rm. Since both types would set s = 0 to myopically
maximize stage pro…t, the low cost type “burns money” to signal by setting an s >0. Denote L’s
signal by sL.14 For the signal to be part of a separating equilibrium, signaling must be costlier for
H than for L. First, the high cost …rm must …nd it less pro…table to send signal sL to induce aL
than to send 0, which induces aH:
¦sum(sL;0;a0;aL; µH) ·¦sum(sH
1 ;0; a0;aH;µH) ) (8)
IC1: ±
£




¦(0;a0; µH) ¡¦(sL;a0; µH)
¤
(9)
Both sides are positive: the left side is the second period gain from fooling the regulator into
believing the …rm is low cost, and the right side is the …rst period gain from not doing so. This
incentive constraint places a lower bound on sL: if sL is too low the high-cost type will not …nd
the signal too costly to mimic.
The other incentive constraint is for the low cost type. The signal sL must be such that the








1 ;a0;µL) ¡¦(sL; a0;µL)
¤
(10)
This incentive constraint places an upper bound on sL: if it is too high L will …nd the signal too
costly to send.
14For ease of presentation, the incentive compatibility constraints are written as if the set of possible low cost
signals is a singleton. This would be so for the case where the regulator has “pessimistic beliefs”: unless it receives
signal s
L, it assumes the …rm is type H. The argument does not change materially if the regulator accepts signals
from a set of possible values.
10Aslong astheupperbound on thesignal sL (de…ned by equality inIC2) is aboveits lowerbound
(de…ned by equality in IC1), a separating equilibrium exists.15 The appendix proves existence for
this model.
Figure 2 depicts a PBE when aL <aH. In the …gure, pro…t increases toward the origin because
both a and s are costly to the …rm. IC1 is depicted by the isopro…t curve for H that goes through
point (0; aH).16 The pro…t for H from sending the signal sL and receiving aL in return must be
lower than the pro…t from the myopically optimal s =0 and receiving aH in return. Signals to the
right of sL, where this isopro…t curve crosses the aL dotted line, satisfy this condition. The heavy
dashed line represents a possible strategy for the regulator that supports a PBE. The regulator
here use a threshold strategy: any signal below sL results in belief b = 0 and action aH, and any
signal at or above sL results in beliefb =1 and action aL.17 Given theregulator’s strategy, L does
best to send signal sL and H does (weakly) best to send s =0. Any other signals put each type on
an isopro…t curve further to the northeast in the …gure, which represents lower pro…t. Note that
this particular regulatory policy induces the lowest-cost signal from L.
Now consider the case where aL >aH. Type H would like to signal its type. However, because
signaling is less costly for the low cost type, no separating equilibrium can exist. The results from
both cases are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the signaling model withconstant…xed costs, if aL <aH aseparating equilibrium
exists. Type L signals with s >0 and receives a <a0 in stage 2 as a result. The type H sets s =0
and receives a >a0 in stage 2 as a result.
15The intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) can be invoked to eliminate all separating equilibria except the
unique Pareto-dominating one, which has the least-costly signal (the lower bound de…ned by IC1). The empirical
predictions from the model do not depend on whether the separating equilibrium is the Pareto-dominating one.
16The isopro…t curves shown in (s;a) space assume that s2 = s
¤
2(a). The appendix shows that the isopro…t curves
have the convex shape shown in …gure 2.
17Many other strategies for the regulator would also support this separating equilibrium, as long as the heavy
dashed line in …gure 2 is between a
L and a
H, above both isopro…t curves, and passes through (s
L;a
L).
112.3 Extending the signaling model: time-varying …xed costs
In dynamic industries such as telecommunications, it is more realistic to assume that the …xed
costs of innovation are not constant but are falling over time. With this extension, a separating
equilibrium may exist even if aL > aH, unlike the constant …xed cost case. Consider the model
from section 2.2 but with the declining …xed costs from section 2.1. The sign of aL ¡aH is still
indeterminate (see theappendix). An added complication when innovation costs are falling is that
the isopro…t curves are no longer monotonic in (a; s) space. However, it is still true that in any
separating equilibrium, type L signals with a higher s than type H when aL < aH, and vice-versa
(given a single-crossing condition) when aH <aL.
Figure 3 depicts the isopro…t curves representing the two incentive compatibility constraints.
Lower isopro…t curves represent higher levels of pro…t. As before, IC1 prevents signal sL (which
results in aL) from giving more pro…t to H than does sH
1 = s¤
1(a0;µH) (which results in aH). The
relevant isopro…t curve for H is the one passing through the point (sH
1 ; aH), and IC1 excludes L’s
signal from being between A and C on thegraph. IC2 prevents L’s signal from giving less pro…t to
L than does sL
1, the stage-optimal s. The relevant isopro…t curve for L is the one passing through
the point (sL
1 ;aH), and IC2 restricts L’s signal to be between B and D on the graph. Thus an
incentive compatible separating equilibrium requires L’s signal to be between C and D. Figure 4
shows one possible separating equilibrium. In the …gure, the signal sL is the least costly incentive-
compatible signal. The regulator uses a threshold strategy (the heavy dashed line) to support
equilibrium in this case: any signal below sL results in aH, and any signal at or above sL results
in aL.18 Given the regulator’s strategy, L does best to send signal sL and H does (weakly) best
to send sH
1 . The appendix shows that when aL <aH, any separating equilibrium has L sending a
larger signal s than H sends. Consequently, it is always the case that sL ¸sL
1 > sH
1 .
When aH < aL instead, then the separating equilibrium has H signaling with a low s (see
18Other strategies for the regulator would also support this separating equilibrium; see footnote 17.
12Figure 5 for onepossibleequilibrium and theappendix for details). In this case, the …rm innovates
quicker than would be stage optimal, to signal that delays have a high cost to the …rm.
The results for the model with time-varying …xed costs are summarized in the following propo-
sitions.
Proposition 4 In the signaling model with time-varying …xed costs, if a separating equilibrium
exists, then:
² when aL < aH, type L signals with sL ¸ sL
1 in stage 1, and the regulator sets a < a0 and L
chooses s2 < sL in stage 2;
² when aL < aH, type H chooses sH
1 in stage 1, and the regulator sets a > a0 and H chooses
s2 > sH
1 in stage 2;
² when aL >aH, type H signals with sH · sH
1 in stage 1, and the regulator sets a <a0 and H
chooses s2 which may be larger or smaller than sH
1 in stage 2;
² when aL > aH, type L chooses sL
1 in stage 1, and the regulator sets a > a0 and L chooses
s2 > sL
1 in stage 2.
The results in Proposition 4 concerning ¢s ´ s2 ¡s follow from Proposition 1, which shows
that the stage-optimal s increases with a. In the third bullet point, ¢s is indeterminate: although
the decrease in a will ensure that s2 < sH
1 , the stage 1 signal also may be below sH
1 to meet IC2
for H.
3 Empirical Predictions and Data
The theoretical model generates predictions for the evolution of innovation and regulatory delay.
The results from the signaling model in section 2.3 depend on whether aH is greaterthan aL, which
in turn depends on second derivative of V. An observer (i.e., the econometrician) will not know
13if aH is greater than aL if the parameters and functional forms in the game are unknown. What
restrictions does the theory place on observed behavior without this knowledge? Proposition 4
implies the following. For type L one would observe s and a decreasing from stage 1 to stage 2 (the
case when aL <aH), or s and a increasing (the case when aL >aH). In short, the signs of¢s and
¢a are equal, and an opposite …nding would reject the model. For type H one would observe s
and a increasing (the case when aL < aH), or a decreasing and an indeterminate change in s (the
case when aL > aH). If type is not known, then the only pattern of changes that would reject the
model is ¢s <0 < ¢a. Such a test is non-parametric, in the sense that it depends only on ¢s and
¢a, and no functional forms need be assumed for pi, CS, or V. The implications of the model are
summarized in Table 1.
Note that the model required that the pro…t, cost, and consumers’ surplus functions were the
samein both stages. In theempirical application, then, I control for variables that a¤ect these(size,
density, and wealth of the market, etc.). Controlling for di¤erence in pro…t, cost, and consumers’
surplus isolates the impact of regulatory delay on innovation.
Data were collected on innovation and introduction dates for new telecommunications services
o¤ered by Ameritech in four of its state jurisdictions: Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin.19
Ameritech, one of the Bell regional holding companies, is the dominant local exchange company
in each of these states, and its intrastate activities are regulated by the state commissions. Intro-
duction of a new service required petitioning the state regulator; the service could not be o¤ered
to subscribers until regulatory approval was granted. Examples of the residential and business
services in the data are new voice mail features, virtual networking services, and high-speed trans-
mission services. The data cover the span 1991 through 1999, which comprises three regulatory
periods.20 In the …rst period, 1991 through mid 1994, Ameritech was under some form of rate of
return regulation in each state. Following this …rst period, each state switched to some form of
19The data are from the tari¤ …ling logs of the company and the state commissions. Supplemental information
was culled from the actual state tari¤s where needed.
20The data for Ohio are complete only for years 1994-1999.
14incentive regulation. After three years of the new regulation, in 1997 the regimes were reviewed
in at least some of these states.21 Thus the regulators had three opportunities to change their
regulatory delay policy (i.e., to change a). Preliminary statistical work revealed that the latter two
periods were indistinguishable in terms of average a and s, and so I take stage one of the game to
correspond to the …rst period and stage two of the game to correspond to the latter two periods.
The …rst di¢culty for the empirical investigation is how to measure s, time between potential
and actual innovation (“innovation delay”). I takethe date at which a serviceis …rst introduced in
any of these states to be t = 0, and then measure s for the other states relative to the …rst state’s
innovation date.22 This e¤ectively underestimates true innovation delay: the true time 0 must be
weakly before the observed …rst “innovation” under this de…nition. However, this measurement
corresponds to the portion of innovation delay that the regulator actually observes, which is the
only useful part for signaling, and therefore is a good measurement of s as used in the model.
To apply the single-…rm single-regulator theoretical model from the previous section, it is assumed
that there areno strategic e¤ects among jurisdictions. To be included in thedata set, a new service
had to be introduced in at least two states. One hundred fourteen services were introduced in at
least two states, generating 349 observations. Summary statistics for the observations on s are in
Table 2. Regulatory delay, a, is measured as thetime from the…rst tari¤…ling submission dateto
the approval date of the last tari¤ …ling for the service.23 Summary statistics for a are in Table 3.
4 The Empirical Tests
The goal of the empirical work is to test the predictions from the signaling model summarized in
Table 1. To this end, I calculate ¢s, ¢a, and attempt to inferthe type ofthe …rm where it matters
21See Roycroft (1999) for more information on the regulatory regimes.
22Some access services were introduced in the federal access tari¤ before in any of the state tari¤s. In such cases s
is calculated using the federal access tari¤ …ling date as t =0 (and an indicator for these observations, FAT, is used
in the statistical work).
23Some services had multiple tari¤ …lings and withdrawals before approval was granted. Regulatory delay data is
not available for Ohio.
15for the tests.
Estimating the change in innovation delay From the raw data in Table 3 it appears that
innovation delay dropped substantially from stage 1 to stage 2. I estimate the entire distribution
of innovation delay in the states in the two stages via a nonparametric method (Figure 8).24 The
…gure presents the survival curves (de…ned to be 1 ¡CDF) and reveals convincing evidence that
stage 2 s stochastically dominates stage 1 s. Estimated means and medians from the curves are
in Table 4, and con…rm the visual evidence from the curves: the mean and median innovation
delay is smaller in each state in stage 2. Although the con…dence intervals for the medians are
non-overlapping only in Indiana and Wisconsin, if a slightly higher quantile is chosen, e.g. the 0.6
quantile (which corresponds to the ordinate 0.4 on the survival curves), the con…dence intervals
are non-overlapping in all states. Thus it appears that ¢s <0 in each state.
Since the nonparametric method does not allow covariates, I turn next to a semiparametric
model to control for economic conditionsand other factors that may changeovertimeand in‡uence
the …rm’s behavior apart from the strategicconsiderationsthat I want to isolate. Estimates from a









where ¸0 is an arbitrary, unspeci…ed baseline hazard and xi is a vector of covariates for spell i.25
Positive coe¢cients for ¯ decrease the hazard and therefore increase mean duration. The …rst
estimation replicates the …nding from the survival curve estimation. When only …xed e¤ects are
included—state dummies (IN, OH, WI), state-speci…c indicators for stage 2 (STATE:reg change),
and the federal tari¤ dummy (FAT, see note 22)—the coe¢cients for the regulatory change all
indicate shorter delay times in stage 2 (see the …rst columns of Table 5). This …nding generally
24The estimates are from Turnbull’s (1974) generalization of the Kaplan-Meier (Kalb‡eisch and Prentice, 1980)
method.
25The Cox (1972; 1975) model uses a
p
N-consistent partial likelihood method to estimate ¯.
16persists when economic covariates are added, such as per capita income (PCI), the number of
access lines in each state (a measure of market size) (ACCESS), population density (denser areas
are cheaper to serve per subscriber due to technologies economies) (DENSITY), and (lagged)
industry telecom patents26 (INDPATt¡1). These covariates are allowed to evolve over the course of
a duration. Adding these variables does not remove the conclusion that ¢s <0 except for Illinois,
for which the coe¢cient loses signi…cance. Formally, one cannot reject the hypothesis that ¢s >0
in Illinois at the 5% level. Taken together, then, the evidence from all estimations indicates that
¢s <0, except possibly in Illinois.
Estimating the change in regulatory delay Evidence on the change in regulatory delay
between thetwo periodscomesfrom several sources. The…rst evidencecomes from theinstitutional
changes that took place in 1994. In each state, expedited approval for new services received special
attention in the new incentive regulation plans. In Illinois, new services deemed competitive were
allowed to beintroduced on oneday’snotice, and many more services were classi…ed ascompetitive
after theregulatory change. In Indiana, all new services wereallowed to beintroduced on oneday’s
notice, down from at least a month of regulatory delay before the new plan. In Ohio, competitive
services were e¤ectively detari¤ed and allowed to be introduced with essentially no regulatory
scrutiny. In Wisconsin, approval for most new services was to be granted after 10 days unless
suspended for investigation, down from about a month under rate of return regulation. The intent
of the new regulation was to ensure that ¢a< 0.
Another source of evidence is to examine the data themselves. Table 3 shows that the mean
and median tari¤ approval delay dropped in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin (no data areavailable
for Ohio), so it appears that ¢a <0. Estimation results lead to similar conclusions. The survival
curves for the regulatory delay data (Figure 9) indicate that stage 2 a stochastically dominates
stage 1 a. Estimated means and medians from the curves are in Table 6: the estimated mean
26The Bell Operating Companies take out few patentsthemselves, andtypically create new servicesfrom underlying
technology patented by others.
17and median regulatory delay is smaller in each state in stage 2. The con…dence intervals for the
medians are non-overlapping in all states.
Similarly, in a Cox estimation (Table 7), the coe¢cientsindicate statistically signi…cant shorter
regulatory delay time in each state in stage 2. When covariates are included instead of state …xed
e¤ects, all three states still show shorter regulatory delay time in stage 2, but the coe¢cient for
Illinois loses signi…cance. The included covariates are political economy variables used in other
studies of regulatory change (Donald and Sappington, 1997): the log annual budget of the regu-
latory authority (PUCBUDGET), an indicator for Republican control of both houses of the state
legislature and a Republican governor (REPUB), and the average value of REPUB from 1984 up
to the previous year.27 Taken together, the evidence from all estimations indicates that ¢a < 0,
except possibly in Illinois.
The test results From the evidence and estimations above it appears that for all states except
possibly Illinois, we have case 1 from Table 1: ¢s < 0 and ¢a < 0. Even without knowledge of
type, these patterns are consistent with the signaling model. To reject the signaling model, it is
necessary that ¢s and ¢a have opposite signs. The statistical evidence shows that this is not the
case in Indiana and Wisconsin. A combination of statistical evidence (for ¢s) and institutional
evidence (for ¢a) suggests that this is also not the case in Ohio. Thus the signaling model is
consistent with the evolution of innovation delay and regulatory delay in these three states.
For Illinois, the negative coe¢cients on ¢s and ¢a are not signi…cant in all estimations, so we
cannot immediately reject thepossibility that we havecase2, 3, or 4 from Table1. Consider these
cases in turn. Case 2 poses no problem for the signaling model; it is consisten with the theory.
Case 3 is consistent with the model only if the …rm is type H.
Can anything be inferred from the data, then, about the …rm’s type in Illinois? Once one
controls for di¤erences across states, then within a stage the di¤erence in (average) s across states
27The other political economy variable used in Donald and Sappington (1997), an indicator for elected public utility
commissioners, can not be used here because commissioners are not elected in any state.
18will be driven by di¤erences in µ. So in an estimation that controls for di¤erences in the pro…t
opportunities among states, any residual …xed e¤ects for the states would give information about
µ. In particular, if both types are present in the data, then the state with the largest negative
…xed e¤ect, and therefore the shortest innovation delay after controlling for pro…tability, is type
H. This follows from Proposition 2; type H …rms will have shorter innovation delay than type L
…rms. Controls for pro…tability include economic and demographic covariates such as those used
in the innovation delay estimation above, and also expected regulatory delay.28 The estimation
results are in the …nal column of Table 5. The estimated …xed e¤ect for IL (coe¢cient IL in the
table) is the largest negative state …xed e¤ect. Therefore, if the …rm is type H anywhere, it is in
Illinois. If the …rm is type H in Illinois, then Case 3 does not reject the signaling model.
Case 4 rejects the model regardless of the …rm’s type. To formally test the hypothesis that
¢s < 0 and ¢a > 0, I applied Wolak’s (1991) testing methodology for inequality constraints in
non-linear models. The p-value from the test using the “IL:reg change” coe¢cients from the …xed
e¤ects models is 0.10. The p-value from the test using the coe¢cients from the covariate models
is 0.36.29 Neither test convincingly rejects the Case 4 hypothesis. For Illinois, then, we are left
with institutional, nonparametric, and semiparametric evidence that Case 1 applies, but also with
semiparametric inference too weak to reject that Case 4 might apply.
5 Conclusion and Further Directions
This paper presents a model that endogenizes innovation timing and regulatory delay. The …rm
uses the timing of new product introduction to signal the marginal cost of regulatory delay to
the regulator. In a separating equilibrium, the regulator responds to the revealed information by
28The variable measuring expected regulatory delay for each observation is constructed assuming the …rm believes
regulatory delay is exponentially distributed (with rate ¸). The expectation is calculated given observed completed
and ongoing delays with Bayesian updating. The prior distribution for ¸ is taken to be Gamma (the conjugate prior).
Regulatory delay data is not available for Ohio and those observations are dropped.
29In neither the innovation delay nor the regulatory delay estimations can a preferred model be selected (between
the …xed e¤ects and covariates versions); Vuong’s (1989) test for non-nested model selection indicates that neither is
preferred to the other.
19adjusting regulatory delay. The model generates testable predictions, which are not rejected by
data gathered from a Bell Operating Company’s operations in four states. The evidence for one of
the states, however, is mixed.
Of course, the empirical evidence does not rule out all other explanations for the observed
evolution of innovation and regulatory delay. However, external evidence on thechanging attitudes
of regulators supports the model. Over the last decade, regulatory commissions (in some cases
prodded by state legislatures) have placed more emphasis on the bene…ts from new products. The
older breed of regulatory o¢cial, accustomed to tight regulatory control and a stable industry,
viewed new products with suspicion. As one regulator put it, “...regulation of telecommunications
remain essential to protect the public from deleterious consequences of innovation...” (Oppenheim,
1991, p.310). Contrast thisview with themore recent goals adopted by regulators in the Ameritech
region to “...facilitate the introduction of innovativenew services in this competitivemarketplace.”
(PSC of Wisconsin, 1998, p.47) This change of attitude about the importance of new products to
consumers and …rms corresponds to the case in the model in which the regulator learns that the
MC of delay is high. In that case (Case 1) the model shows that both innovation and regulatory
delay fall over time, which is exactly what happens in the data.
There are two interesting extensions to the model that deserve future attention. First, in the
current formulation actions undertaken in one jurisdiction have no signaling value to regulators
in the other jurisdictions (apart from alerting regulators that a certain service is technologically
feasible after it is introduced in the …rst state), and the …rm’s decision is taken to be independent
across states. A logical next step for themodel is to expand the signaling gameto include multiple
receivers of the …rm’s multiple signals. Whether such a model will generate predictions restrictive
enough to falsify the model remains to be seen.
Another extension would be to explicitly incorporate unregulated rivals into the model. The
only impact of competition in the current model is indirect: it may a¤ect the MC of delay to the
…rm (µ) or the regulator’s bene…ts of delay (V). Given that local telecommunications competition
20was just getting o¤theground during the period studied, including competition in the model seems
to be most useful for application to future data sets.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 First, from (1), @¦=@a = ¡e¡ra¼(µ) < 0. Second, letting s¤(a; µ) =
argmax¦(s; a;µ), we can …nd @s¤=@a by di¤erentiation of (2), since (2) holds for all a: @s¤
@a =
re¡ra¼(µ)
F 00(s¤)¡rF 0(s¤) > 0, where the inequality follows from the assumptions on F (i.e., F0 < 0 and
F00 >0.
Proof of Proposition 2 The marginal cost of delay to the …rm is the same whether the delay
stems from the …rm’s or the regulator’s choice. We can …nd @s¤=@µ by di¤erentiation of (2), since
(2) holds for all µ: @s¤
@µ = ¡
e¡ra¼0(µ)
F 00(s¤)¡rF 0(s¤) < 0, where the inequality follows from the assumptions
on F.
Is aL < aH? Assume for the moment that the …rm’s type is known (as it will be in a separating
equilibrium), so that (7) represents the …rst-order condition for the welfare-maximizing a. Then
the impact of a marginal change in type on the regulator’s choice of delay may be found by
di¤erentiating (7), since (7) holds for all µ. Integrating the resulting da¤=dµ over the discrete
change in type from µL to µH tells us whether aL < aH or vice versa. The derivative of (7) with
































@t2 +V 00(a) + @2¦
@a2
(13)
Recall that by assumptionwehave@CSi=@t < 0, @CSi=@µ ¸0, @2CSi=@t2 ¸ 0, and@2CSi=@t@µ ·
0. Theotherelementsrequired to sign(13) are @2¦
@a@µ = ¡e¡ra¼0(µ) <0 and @2¦
@a2 = @
@a (¡e¡ra¼(µ)) =
re¡ra¼(µ) > 0. Therefore if V(a) is linear or convex, da¤=dµ is unambiguously positive. However,
23the more natural assumption would bethat V(a) is concave (i.e., that themarginal bene…t ofdelay
to the regulator declines as delay increases), and thus the sign of da¤=dµ is ambiguous in general.
If the sign of a marginal change in type is ambiguous, then so is the sign of a discrete change in
type from L to H. Thus the sign of aL ¡aH is not known.
Isopro…t curves when …xed costs are constant Here I show that the isopro…t curves in
…gure 2 must slope down. The slope of an isopro…t curve in (s;a) space is found from (3), which
expands to ¦sum =e¡rs [¡F +e¡ra0¼(µ)=r]+±[¡F +e¡ra¼(µ)=r] (recall s2 is zero in equilibrium).




er(s¡a)±¼(µ) , which is always negative because
@¦
@s <0 and @¦




















Conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium with constant …xed costs If
theparticipationconstraint ismet, aseparatingequilibriumalwaysexistswhenaL <aH. Whenever
the isopro…t curves of the two types cross, L’s has the ‡atter slope (a “single-crossing” property).

























If ¼ is a positive function, integrating (15) between µL and µH shows that the sign of the non-
marginal changebetweenthetwo typesisnegative. ThusH hasa steeperdownward-slopedisopro…t
curve than L at every point of crossing. Then the isopro…t curves must be as depicted in Figure 2,
and the “L” signal is too costly for type H to send but not too costly for L to send. The incentive
constraints are satis…ed and a separating equilibrium exists.
24The sign of da¤=dµ with time-varying …xed costs The derivative of (7) with respect to µ in





































@a2 +V 00(a) + @2¦
@a2
(16)
Given that (13) was of indeterminate sign, it is no surprise that (16) is also indeterminate.
Isopro…t curves with time-varying …xed costs As above, the slope of an isopro…t curve
in (s; a) space is ¡(@¦sum=@s)=(@¦sum=@a) = ¡(@¦=@s)=[±(@¦=@a)]. Since the denominator is
negative, the slope is positive to the right of s¤
1(a0;µ) and negative to the left (recall that from (2),
@¦=@s evaluated at s¤
1(a0; µ) is zero). Thus the isopro…t curves take a maximum at sL
1 for L and
sH
























The signs of the unambiguous pieces are @¦
@a < 0 (as noted in the proof of Proposition 1), @2¦
@a@µ =
¡e¡r(a+s2)¼0
2 < 0, and @2¦
@s@µ = ¡e¡r(a0+s)¼0(µ) < 0. The only term that changes sign with s is @¦
@s ,
which as noted above is positive for s < s¤
1(a0; µ) and negative for s > s¤
1(a0; µ). Thus to the left
of s¤
1(a0;µ), (17) is negative, meaning that for a marginal decrease in type from type H, the slope
gets steeper.
By implication, whenever the isopro…t curves of the two types depicted in Figure 3 cross to
the left of sH
1 , then the curve for H is ‡atter than the curve for L. Therefore, any separating
equilibrium with aH > aL has L sending a larger signal s than H sends and sL ¸ sL
1 > sH
1 . The
case ruled out would have L’s signal lower than sH
1 (depicted in Figure 6). The only way L’s signal
could be lower than sH
1 is if point B is to the left of point A. In that case L’s signal could be
between B and A. But then there must be a point E where the two isopro…t curves cross, and at
E, H’s curve is steeper. Since E must be to the left of sH
1 , the proposition states that the H curve
must be ‡atter, so point E creates a contradiction.
To the right of s¤, the sign of (17) is ambiguous.
25The single-crossing condition with time-varying …xed costs When aH < aL we want to
rule out the (nonintuitive) case in which H signals with a high s. To the right of the peaks of
the isopro…t curves, the sign of (17) is ambiguous, and H’s curve might cross L’s curve again (see
Figure 7). As in the constant …xed cost case, a single-crossing condition rules out this behavior.
The single-crossing condition for time-varying …xed costs is essentially the same as (15), with an
extra negative term involving the derivative of F on the left side of the inequality. The condition
always holds given the assumptions of the model, and thus cases like that depicted in Figure 7 are
ruled out.
26Figure 1: Determination of Optimal Innovation Date
27Figure 2: A separating equilibrium when …xed costs are constant and aL <aH
Figure 3: Incentive constraints (aL <aH and falling …xed costs)
28Observed Outcomes Implications from
Case ¢s ¢a the Signaling Model
1 ¡ ¡ possible for either type
2 + + possible for either type
3 + ¡ possible only for type H
4 ¡ + impossible
Table notes: see Proposition 4. These outcomes are based on the model in section 2.3 with decreasing …xed
costs.
Table 1: Empirical Predictions from the Signaling Model
Innovation Delay Innovation Delay
Before Regulatory Change After Regulatory Change
Sample Stage 1 (1991–mid 1994) Stage 2 (mid 1994–1999)
State N min mean median max N min mean median max N
IL 95 0 128 34 665 34 0 45 0 503 62
IN 77 0 457 199 2605 29 0 159 45 1318 48
OH 65 361 1267 1235 2518 8 0 98 26 1071 62
WI 106 0 357 150 2441 40 0 100 18 1667 66
Total 349 111 238
Table notes: …gures are in days. See text for calculation of s.
Table 2: Change in Innovation Delay Between Stages (¢s)
29Regulatory Delay Regulatory Delay
Before Regulatory Change After Regulatory Change
Sample Stage 1 (1991–mid 1994) Stage 2 (mid 1994–1999)
State N min mean median max N min mean median max N
IL 97 1 36 46 48 29 1 30 16 248 68
IN 69 43 103 83 217 15 1 13 3 152 54
WI 103 2 106 44 752 25 1 9 10 48 78
Total 269
Table notes: …gures are in days. Regulatory delay data are not available for Ohio.
Table 3: Change in Regulatory Delay Between Stages (¢a)
Lower 95% conf. Upper 95% conf.
State Period Mean (s.e.) Median limit for median limit for median
IL Stage 1 126.5 (32.4) 32 0 53
Stage 2 45.0 (13.1) 0 0 0
IN Stage 1 320.7 (97.6) 106 76 221
Stage 2 133.5 (38.2) 42 28 53
OH Stage 1 1413 (309) 1493 0 1493
Stage 2 87.3 (23.2) 19 13 32
WI Stage 1 356.6 (81.6) 143 77 201
Stage 2 99.5 (31.4) 19 3 23
Table notes: …gures (in days) are based on survival curve estimates (see Figure 8). Stage 1 is 1991 to mid
1994, Stage 2 is thereafter.
Table 4: Estimated innovation delay s
30Figure 4: A separating equilibrium (aL <aH and falling …xed costs)
Figure 5: Incentive constraints (aH <aL, falling …xed costs)
31Figure 6: Impossible case for incentive constraints
Figure 7: Incentive constraints ruled out by the single-crossing condition
32Figure 8: Nonparametric survival curves for innovation delay s
33Figure 9: Nonparametric survival curves for regulatory delay a
34Cox Proportional Hazards Models
Fixed E¤ects Covariates Type Estimation
State coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
IL:reg change –0.365¤ (0.214) –0.024 (0.273) –0.270 (0.307)
IN:reg change –0.727¤¤¤ (0.277) –0.822¤¤¤ (0.252) –2.064¤¤¤ (0.461)
OH:reg change –6.360¤¤¤ (0.391) –0.768¤¤¤ (0.291) y
WI:reg change –1.355¤¤¤ (0.220) –0.722¤¤¤ (0.236) –2.780¤¤¤ (0.379)
IL –0.649¤¤ (0.290) –7.131 (4.401)
OH 5.551¤¤¤ (0.444) y
WI 0.380 (0.318) 1.206¤¤ (0.587)
FAT 0.654¤¤¤ (0.137) 0.559¤¤¤ (0.138) 0.641¤¤¤ (0.183)
PCI –4.531¤ (2.096) –8.015¤ (4.896)
ACCESS –0.382 (0.386) 5.884 (4.175)
DENSITY 0.473 (0.401) 1.227 (1.051)
INDPATt¡1 –0.024 (0.273) –0.440 (0.568)
EXPDELAY –0.020¤¤¤ (0.003)
N 580 580 397y
Log likelihood –1626.3 –1632.0 –1129.0
* = 10% level signi…cance; ** = 5% level signi…cance; *** = 1% level signi…cance.
y Regulatory delay data are not available for Ohio.
Table notes: The model incorporates time-varying covariates. Larger positive coe¢cients imply longer
delays. Std. errors are adjusted for multiple observations (clustering) from a state and from an individual
service across states. The number of observations is apparently higher than in Table 2 only because of the
coding of time-varying covariates; the number of actual events underlying both models is the same. Excluded
state dummy is Illinois. FAT is an indicator for innovation delays calculated from the initial date the service
was …led in the Federal Access Tari¤; other delays calculated from the date of the …rst …ling in a state tari¤
(with …rst state’s delay changed from 0 to 0.5). PCI is per capita personal income in the state. ACCESS
is the number of access lines of Ameritech’s subscribers in the state. DENSITY is the state’s population
divided by its area. INDPATt¡1 is the one-year lagged count of patents approved in the classes relevant to
telecommunications services (359,370,379, and 395). The constant in the Cox model is absorbed into the
unspeci…ed baseline hazard.
Table 5: Semiparametric estimation results for innovation delay s
35Lower 95% conf. Upper 95% conf.
State Period Mean (s.e.) Median limit for median limit for median
IL Stage 1 36.2 (3.3) 46 46 46
Stage 2 30.1 (4.7) 17 3 45
IN Stage 1 103.4 (16.4) 83 57 120
Stage 2 13.0 (4.0) 3 3 3
WI Stage 1 105.6 (36.9) 44 24 62
Stage 2 9.5 (0.7) 10 10 10
Table notes: …gures (in days) are based on survival curve estimates (see Figure 9). Stage 1 is 1991 to mid
1994, Stage 2 is thereafter. Regulatory delay data are not available for Ohio.
Table 6: Estimated regulation delay a
Cox Proportional Hazards Model
Fixed E¤ects Covariates
State coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
IL:reg change –0.278¤ (0.163) –0.194 (0.222)
IN:reg change –1.750¤¤¤ (0.309) –1.831¤¤¤ (0.329)








* = 10% level signi…cance; ** = 5% level signi…cance; *** = 1% level signi…cance.
Table notes: See notes to Table 5. Regulatory delay data are not available for Ohio. PUCBUDGET is the
log budget of the state PUC. REPUB is an indicator for a Republican governor and Republican majority
in both houses of the state legislature. REPUBH is the average value of REPUB from 1984 to the previous
year.
Table 7: Semiparametric estimation results for regulatory delay a
36